Progressive Youth Activism: 95 Theses

What is the youth vote? What is the state of youth activism? These are moving topics, that change year by year. Every few years, there is an impulse to write a new Port Huron Statement. Problem with that is, no one person or small group of people can create a static document that is representative of the views of young people or encompassing the political environment in which they are operating.

Any such document needs to be a living, breathing, changing document written collaboratively.

So here's my stab at describing the state of that amorphous entity "the youth vote," and the state of youth vote activism. This is a wiki, so "be bold!" and edit, add links, suggest changes, and help make this as tight and accurate a document as it can be.

1. Young voters are not apathetic.
   
2. The Millennial Generation is more engaged civically and politically than its recent predecessors, particularly Generation X.
   
3. This is exemplified, in part, by their participation in community service organizations, and also by their rising turnout at the voting booth.
   
4. Young voter turnout dramatically increased in 2004 (pdf).
   
5. Rising turnout and engagement of young voters is a trend, not a fad.  Youth Vote turnout was also up in both 2005 (pdf), and 2006 (pdf)(and I predict will be up even more in 2008).
   
6. Millennials are soon going to be the largest voting block in the country.  In 2008 they will be 50 million strong, and by the time the entire cohort is of voting age will comprise 36% of the electorate (pdf).
   
7. Young voters already outnumber those over 65 as a share of the electorate, yet receive less attention from campaigns and the media.
   
8. The 2004 election broke a two-cycle stalemate that saw the parties evenly split young voters.  
   
9. In 2004, the youth vote chose Kerry over Bush by 10 points - the only age demographic to choose the Democrats.  
   
10. This is also a trend.  In both 2005 and 2006, young voters continued to choose Democrats by increasing margins, topping out at almost 2-1 in 2006 (pdf).
    
11. Young voters are the most tolerant, diverse generation in history.
    
12. On a variety of issues - the environment/energy, the war in Iraq, health care, the economy, and most social issues - young voters are more progressive than they have been in years.
    
13. Young voters are more likely than ever to identify with Democrats than with Republicans.  
    
14. All of these facts taken together indicate that young voters could be the base of a long-term, progressive majority.
    
15. The previous statement is not a given, and will not happen without action on the part of progressives and Democrats to secure the allegiance of Millennials.
    
16. Young voters have primarily voted in reaction to President Bush, the war, and Republican corruption.  They have NOT voted FOR a Democratic vision.
    
17. If the Democrats fail to sufficiently change the course of the country and offer a positive vision counter to that of Republicans, the youth vote can swing back the other way, much as it did during the 80s.  
    
18. Young voters will participate if you ask them (pdf) . . .
    
19. But the Democratic Party stopped asking with any seriousness years ago.
    
20. This change occurred in the 80s, when young voters flipped on progressives and started voting for Reagan, and continued through Gen X, whose general disengagement from electoral politics and activism spawned the "apathetic youth" meme.
    
21. As a result, for years, campaigns looked at young voters solely as free labor, not as a voting constituency.
    
22. Most of the recent increases in young voter turnout and progressive partisanship was brought about by nonpartisan voter registration/GOTV organizations and new 527 organizations working outside the party structure.
    
23. Groups like Young Voter Strategies and the Young/College Dems are pushing within the beltway and out among the state parties for the Party to take young voters seriously.
    
24. This is slowly changing, but still needs to be internalized by many in the Democratic Establishment.  
    
25. Some results of that change - and the possibilities they offer - were highly visible in 2006, when young voters were responsible for some key democratic victories, most notably Jon Tester, Jim Webb and Joe Courtney (data will be available at Young Voter Strategies on June 5th)
    
26. Partisanship is a habit.(pdf)  If someone votes for the same party in three major elections before they turn 30, they are likely to stay with that party for the rest of their lives.
    
27. We are approaching the first election where a portion of young voters will be casting that "third" ballot - making 2008 and especially important year for youth vote outreach.
    
28. After November 2008, the job is not done.  Young voter outreach is a longterm project that never ends.  2008 is merely the first of many "thirds."
    
29. Same Day registration and mail-in voting can significantly increase youth vote turnout (by as much as 14% (pdf).  
    
30. Local progressive organizations and state parties should be pushing for legislation to enact those policies in all 50 states.
    
31. The youth vote is not a monolithic voting bloc.  It contains multitudes.
    
32. The many constituencies that comprise the youth vote include but should not be limited to: college students, high school students, commuter college students, non-college youth, young parents, single parents, active duty military, veterans, 1st and 2nd generation Americans.
    
33. Each constituency will require slightly different tactics to reach it's members, and a slightly different message to convert its members.
    
34. Cultural signifiers matter just as much - if not more - than race, religion, or ideology when reaching young people.  Young voters are first and foremost  punks, hip hop, skaters, hipsters, etc.
    
35. Culture is a progressive's natural advantage.  We should use it.
    
36. 95% of the people in these constituencies won't ever care about politics as much as you do.  
    
37. Asking them to participate in hard core political actions (canvassing, phone banking, etc) as their first introduction to politics is doomed to failure and low conversion rates.
    
38. Politics must be made relevant to the life of a person if you want them to participate and make civic participation a habit.
    
39. This means there must be a ladder of participation providing substantive involvement for people at multiple levels of engagement.
    
40. Those levels of engagement must take into account youth culture.
    
41. Politics can and should be fun.
    
42. Peer to peer outreach is the gold standard of youth outreach.
    
43. Canvassing is only one form of peer outreach. (pdf)
    
44. You must reach people where they are, and find a way to engage them through something they are already doing (ie concerts, FaceBook, bars, nightclubs, etc.)
    
45. Non traditional outreach at these non traditional venues is an effective way to make politics fun, relevant, culturally acceptable.
    
46. The surest, longterm way to increase youth vote turnout is to make political participation a cultural phenomenon.
    
47. This will require an expansion of the memberships of traditional and new progressive youth institutions beyond "the usual suspects" - resume padders, aspiring politicos, Beltway insiders in waiting - as well as the creation of new organizations specializing in making politics a social and cultural phenomenon.
    
48. Old organizations like the College Democrats and Young Democrats are struggling with this transition, but both groups - particularly the Young Democrats - are taking big strides to reach larger audiences and accommodate a wide variety of levels of participation.
    
49. There is a movement building in the progressive youthroots.
    
50. This movement is cognizant of many of the issues raised thus far and is specifically organizing to address those issues because the party has been negligent in addressing them.
    
51. This movement started in 2002 and 2003 with the beginning of a [dot]org Boom in youth organizing that continues to this day.
    
52. Many organizations - cultural and political - laid the groundwork for this [dot]org Boom and the incredible rise in turnout, but 2003/2004 are watershed years in youth vote activism.
    
53. The [dot]org boom is the second instantiation of the civic mindedness and entrepreneurial spirit of the Millennial Generation, and 2004 was the election in which the leading edge of the Millennial Generation cut their political teeth.
    
54. Operating primarily outside the party structure, [dot]org boom is filling a number of gaps in youth organizing infrastructure including: leadership training (Center for Progressive Leadership, Young People For), policy training (Roosevelt Institution, DMI Scholars), media (Campus Progress, Student Nation), local grassroots infrastructure (Oregon Bus Project, Forward Montana), and cultural communities (Living Liberally).
    
55. A great deal of new programs (and funding resources) focus on leadership training and development.  This is important, but we must also be cognizant of what types of leaders we are creating.  It is entirely possible we'll end up producing a new class of insiders who replicate the practices the establishment that drove young voters away from politics in the first place.
    
56. The progressive youth movement is divided along a spectrum.  
    
57. On one end are those who view political participation as primarily an electoral activity and the Democratic Party as a vehicle for change.  
    
58. On the other are those who view politics through a social justice movement lens that looks to community organizing and issue based activism to accomplish social change.
    
59. This spectrum tracks along multiple race, class, and ideological lines.  
    
60. Most of the entrepreneurial activity in the last 4 years has taken place in the electoral realm.
    
61. There are a few exceptions, notably bridge organizations like the League of Young Voters and DMI scholars, and base organizations like Elementz and MyBLOC.
    
62. We must build bridges between these organizations and sectors of the progressive youth movement.
    
63. These bridges are not meant to erase the divide, which exist for good reasons (you must reach people where they are in the language and level at which they are comfortable), but to allow best practices to flow between groups, and allow each group to remain cognizant of the concerns of the other.  It is only with such bridges that we can have a strong, united progressive movement that works towards common goals for all members of our coalition.
    
64. Funding is a barrier to creating those bridges, and represents a huge problem for young voter outreach in general.
    
65. Young voters cannot and for the most part do not financially support the political organizations of which they are members.
    
66. Young voters are donating to the Democratic Presidential campaigns, probably in the single millions of dollars by the end of the cycle.
    
67. This money COULD help convince political hacks and party operatives that the youth vote is worth their time and resources - a worthy cause.
    
68. However, it would probably be better spent investing in long-term youth outreach infrastructure that can give young voters a bigger place at the political table.
    
69. There is a cadre of mega-funders who are taking notice of the youth vote, and working to create a progressive youth movement, but it is not enough.
    
70. Conservatives outspend progressives on young voter outreach and leadership development by almost 5 to 1.  
    
71. Conservative organizations donate upwards of $48 million dollars per year to their youth vote outreach and leadership programs - just as much as the Democracy Alliance gave out to ALL progressive organizations in its first year.
    
72. That means that many progressive organizations, who should be working together, are competing for resources from the same, small pool of money.
    
73. Some progressive organizations - notably the Generational Alliance - are working together to create a coherent core to progressive youth organizing.
    
74. These groups do not step on each other's core competencies, and so work together to secure funding and handle specific pieces of youth infrastructure.
    
75. Many of the youth organizations that sit on the Social Justice/Racial Justice/Community Organizing side of the political spectrum are the ones with the least resources.
    
76. Many groups on the electoral side work hard to create diversity in their memberships (including covering all costs for leadership training events).
    
77. But their models are still exclusionary in that the pools from which they draw applicants (politically savvy, college students) are unavailable to the most under-served members of our society.
    
78. Far too often, progressive youth groups - especially on campus - are playing defense against their more aggressive conservative counterparts.  
    
79. This conservative advantage is amplified by the Republican Noise Machine.
    
80. Conservative youth programs, while at times outrageous, are frequently much more fun and much more media savvy than programs by progressive youth outfits.
    
81. Progressive youth groups need to turn the tables - stop playing defense, get creative, and go on the attack.
    
82. Protest is dead.
    
83. Yet many younger voters know of no other forms of activism, and have a knee jerk reaction that protest is the response to any issue.  
    
84. This plays into the campus conservative battle plan, which relies on "typical liberal responses" - protests, PC complaints - as a foil.
    
85. Many young progressive activists do not know where the levers of power are on campus, in their town, in their state, or nationally.  
    
86. We must create ways to educate young voters/political entrepreneurs on how to build power, move power, and navigate the bureaucratic levers of our democracy to create change.
    
87. The advantage that progressives hold online over their conservative counterparts is also present at the youth vote level.
    
88. More progressive youth are on social networks than conservatives, and more progressive youth activists are taking advantage of those tools.
    
89. Social Networks are the new public spaces - or "third places" - where young people spend their time.  
    
90. So progressive organizations and Democratic campaigns looking to harness the growing power of the youth vote must find new ways create a dynamic presence in these online communities.
    
91. Widgets and new developments in open APIs like FaceBook may or may not be the solution we're looking for.  This should be one of the most highly monitored and tested strategies of the 2008 election cycle.
    
92. The progressive youth movement is still siloed online, disconnected from each other and from the progressive blogosphere.
    
93. The Executive Directors of these groups are in contact with each other, and personal networks connect these organizations, but the progressive youth movement is bigger than 20 - 30 Executive Directors.
    
94. Progressive youth organizations should start linking, and keep their members apprised of the activities of other organizations, and break down those silos.
    
95. Progressive youth organizations need to learn to move FaceBook, YouTube, and MySpace activism offline and into local blogospheres to build power and counteract the Republican Noise Machine.