The Ohio Method
Despite the final outcome, those who participated in VoteMob and Downtown for Democracy saw the profound effect of peer-to-peer outreach paired with innovative data, media and targeting strategies. By throwing parties, hitting the bars, canvassing clubs, and going anywhere we thought there may be young voters we were able to compile a list of 130,000 young voters- we registered over 10,000 alone. Our persistence paid off. In Columbus turn out increased among VoteMob contacts by 30.1%- around 76% of our registered contacts turned out- we beat overall turnout (including the old folks) by 6% and we beat under 30 turnout by 17.3%. Regular campaigns celebrate if they move the needle 5%, let alone 30%. (Thanks to Drew at WayPoint Data Solutions for running the anlysis). In some precincts the Democratic vote was an astounding 187% higher. More importantly, there was no correspondent increase in Republican turnout. In terms of raw numbers in our targeted precincts statewide, 4 new Democratic voters made it to the polls for every new Republican added, demonstrating that our targeted efforts helped to increase the margin for the Democrats and deny any comparable advantage to the Republicans. While final reports of turnout are being completed in Ohio, the results in Columbus are indicative of our performance statewide:
While we were not operating in a vacuum, we were the group that had primary responsibility for these precincts and the demographic as a whole. Through regional and statewide coordination with other 527’s in the America Votes coalition, we divvied up the precincts so as not to duplicate efforts. While we spoke to many young voters who resided outside these precincts, our most comprehensive effort was exercised in these precincts, utilizing the full range of new and traditional field strategies.
How we did it
These unprecedented increases can be attributed to our innovations in voter targeting, data collection, media and phone strategies. Our first step was to delay door-to-door canvassing until the fall. We began operating in mid-June and realized that the vast majority of residents in our targeted college precincts were not in residence and had probably moved from their last address after the spring semester. In addition, any information collected during the summer in canvassing efforts would likely be inaccurate come the fall. The data we were able to pull from the ACT Van was therefore outdated. Subsequent acquisition of “fresher†databases from NPG and Blaemeier by 21st Century Democrats proved wasteful as the lag in updates and difficulty of matching incoming data made the platforms and lists as unhelpful as the ACT Van. By the fall, I had designed an online database and recruited a programmer to build a platform that allowed us to query the incoming data from the field. Our database, VoterTrak, proved considerably more reliable and cost effective than any provided by national vendors. We were able to tailor an online data entry form to simplify entry of collected data. Then we wrote queries within our data parameters and targeted our on-campus and precinct voters by generating updated and accurate dorm and precinct walk lists.
Summer Strategy
We decided to concentrate all of our efforts on site-based voter education, persuasion and registration efforts. We began scouring Cleveland and Columbus for venues frequented by young voters. Our outreach efforts fell under three categories; night life venues, major events, and day shifts. The day shifts were the hardest to fill due to the difficulty of finding a fresh supply of high traffic areas frequented by youth. Parks, rec centers, bus stops, shopping districts, and lunch hour eateries proved to be the best targets, but yielded fewer contacts per hour than night life venues and large events. Informal agreements with clubs and bars allowed our Mobbers free access to shows and bars where they could work the crowds freely. When we were not allowed entry to a venue, we would canvass the patrons as they came and went or lined up for shows. Maintaining a consistent contact rate and avoiding saturation of friendly venues were the greatest challenges we faced utilizing this method.
Regardless, by Sept. 14th we were able to talk to 50,810 young voters, collecting 35,649 cell and telephone numbers and 26,781 emails during the process. Gathering current cell numbers and emails greatly increased our ability to follow up with those we spoke to, regardless of whether their address changed between our initial contact and Election Day.
Fall Strategy
By late September, we had additional phone lines installed in the Columbus and Cleveland offices, expanding our ability to follow-up with voters. We classed our contacts in different groups according to their party preference and began verifying the registration status of our hard and likely supporters, calling the undecided voters to persuade them based on their issue preference and confirm their registration status, and identifying potential problem voters- mainly contacts that excluded information from their registration form. For more detail on the phone strategy, please see the endnotes.
In the fall we instituted our campus program. Throughout the summer we had been recruiting campus and dorm captains to head our efforts and assist in the execution of our field plans on 13 campuses with a total population of 174,205 students. Our strategy differed from campus to campus. By taking into consideration the make-up of the student population and the residency patterns on a given campus, we were able to create and fill positions according to the particular needs of the institution. For example, on commuter campuses, we did not focus on the surrounding precincts and there were no dorm populations so our organizers focused on reaching out to existent groups and focusing on transit points on and around the campuses. Our follow-up efforts on commuter campuses were limited to second face-to-face encounters on campus and phone and email contacts.
The two greatest challenges in campus organizing were maintaining accountability for campus based organizers and maintaining access to the campuses. The daily reporting structure we used during the summer proved insufficient for tracking campus activity. As we developed our on-line database and the capability to track data entry via ISP addresses, it became apparent that several organizers were not entering sufficient fresh data nor recruiting the needed volunteers. University students proved to be the least reliable work force. Many well-intentioned students found themselves over-committed, and others simply failed to carry through on their obligations. This resulted in strategic shifts at individual universities. New on-campus organizers were hired, or greater responsibility for on-campus contacts was delegated to full time, non-enrolled organizers. Students who worked for us during the summer proved to be the most reliable enrolled organizers in the fall. More dynamic, digitalized methods of data collection would increase accountability for organizers who are not based in an office.
Maintaining access to campuses was challenging at some institutions. Partisan political speech is effectively banned at some private universities, and canvassing within dorms is often not tolerated. Recruiting dorm captains that lived in targeted residence halls was one way to circumvent restrictions. Enrolled volunteers also founded university chapters of Vote Mob, insuring our ability to cover campus events and recruit volunteers directly. However, if a college decides to exclude an organization from their campus, organizers may be restricted to canvassing the surrounding business districts and residential areas. The legality of such exclusion is questionable but, due to our compressed schedule in Ohio during the ’04 election, exploration of legal recourse was impractical. There is a dire need for further legal advocacy to protect free speech and voting rights for students at colleges and universities nationally. This extends to the chronic shortage of polling booths in university precincts. In my view, this pattern constitutes systematic disenfranchisement as lines at several institutions across Ohio lasted 2 or more hours. In on case in Knox County, college voters were reportedly waiting 8 hours to cast their votes.
Volunteers
Key to our efforts was volunteers. Locally, we developed good bases, but relied on large influxes from out-of-state, particularly New York. We also organized volunteer phone banks at firms and residences on the East Coast. Downtown for Democracy began bussing in volunteers from New York in late August and continued through Election Day. By the end, they had sent (#?) volunteers to Ohio.
The typical trip began Thursday night, the volunteers arriving in Ohio on Friday morning, put through training and put into the field or on the phones. Housing was provided, and we tried to provide breakfast and lunch. A party was usually held on Friday or Saturday night in conjunction with the volunteer trips. We wrapped with feedback sessions where we tried to guage the success of our program in facilitating the volunteers and insuring they felt the work they were doing was effective. Our focus on accommodation, training, entertainment and communication provided for a rewarding volunteer experience for most of those involved. Volunteers returned repeatedly from late summer until Election Day.
Approaching young voters in bars and music venues where they were more open to discuss politics than when at home, and having the tools to persuade and educate them proved very appealing to our volunteers. They were especially encouraged when we informed them that peer-to-peer contact had been proven to increase youth turnout by 20%.
Leadership
As state director, I encouraged initiative within the parameters that were set and a constant re-evaluation of our strategy and targeting. The full amount of funding never materialized, and the budget was in constant flux, so any inefficiency in the program had to be dealt with immediately. The disparities between the cities and campuses required initiative on the part of regional organizers and consultation with headquarters in order to arrive at the appropriate approach for each locale and campus. Because we were dealing with a highly transient population and did not knock on doors until the final weeks of the campaign, regional organizers had to determine where and when to target young voters. The flexibility of the organization and emphasis on initiative was especially effective in giving a sense of ownership and empowerment to the organizers. Budgets were alloted and it was up to the organizers to insure that we were using every penny as effectively as possible. Daily reporting allowed me to see red flags and track the performance of individual canvassers, but if goals were met and the numbers looked good, I tried not to micromanage.
Examples of initiative expanded beyond targeting. For example, regional variations in the scripts were incorporated and changes in the parameters of the campus program were instituted on a college by college basis. Jackie Bray, who had far more campus organizing experience than I, took the lead on determining which campuses would be best to start out with. Jayson, a seasoned canvasser, devised his own method to create accurate walk lists because we could not cut reliable ones from any of the vendor databases. Alex River and I devised parameters and SQL queries that allowed us to hone in on voters that would have been turned away from the polls or forced to vote provisionally.
In a traditional campaign with pre-collected data, the outreach strategy remains static. You are given a list, you call and knock, you update the status of the voters in terms of their candidate support, and you do your best to build your hard count for GOTV. The only dynamism is in which lists you run and contact, and that is often decided solely by headquarters. Mobbers had to figure out where youth were, what bands would have a conservative crowd, which venues would yield more contacts, etc. By relying on a dynamic, site-based strategy organizers came to know their constituencies extremely well and the greater ownership of their efforts was reflected in the quality of the conversations that were going on in the bars, on the phone, or at the park. It was truly inspiring, and the end result is manifest in our returns.
As Alex Rivers said, everyone accomplished at least one impossible thing because they really felt responsible and empowered. It is imperative to the future of the party that young leaders and organizers are given leverage and are encouraged to be creative- far more talented individuals will stay in the party and eschew more lucrative pursuits. The best companies aggressively recruit talent and cultivate it, rewarding effort and initiative. In Democratic politics you kill yourself carrying out the orders of one or two higher ups, and you are rewarded with poverty wages and no support network after the polls are closed. If you don’t have a trust fund and want to stay in the game, you go and temp or live with mom and dad and try to cultivate your connections so you can go back at it again. Many talented organizers drop out of the game because the financial and personal hardship of campaign life is exacerbated by the free-fall scenarios that follow elections. Many distinctly untalented organizers and operatives are pushed along because they have the financial means or connections to hang around, not because they are good. Look at the Kerry campaign. Everyone asked what VoteMob was going to do after the election, how they could stay involved- all I could tell them was that it wouldn’t exist as we knew it and that everything in Ohio would shutdown. Even though work was expected after the election, November 2nd was the last day most of my organizers were paid.
